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Summary 
 
 Most people visit formal financial institutions or use online banking services 
when they should send funds across borders.  However, some people use unauthorized 
remittance operators, or informal fund transfer systems (IFT-systems), to send 
remittances to foreign countries.  IFT-systems may be an unknown phenomenon to the 
general public.  They may not have a clear idea on how IFT-systems work and whether 
they are perceived as acceptable and legitimate in society.  This study was conducted to 
examine why and how IFT-systems survive in a globally connected world and how they 
adapt to changing environments.  Before addressing the question, this study first 
discussed about the legitimacy of IFT-systems in parallel with an illustration of the basic 
working mechanisms of them.  That is because the legitimacy of IFT-systems is 
associated with the risks — external and internal risks —that IFT-systems face and cope 
with.  While describing the working mechanism of IFT-systems, this study showed that 
IFT-systems adopt the same mechanisms as formal remittance systems.  This study also 
examined how IFT-systems differ from formal remittance systems, explaining that IFT-
systems have two aspects — a channel for cross-border fund transferring and a channel 
for money laundering.  While examining the roles that IFT-systems play in a given 
society, this study contrasted two approaches: an economic approach and a 
criminological approach.  The two approaches relate to different positions on the 
legitimacy of IFT-systems: While the economic approach tends to construe IFT-systems 
as legitimate albeit illegal, the criminological approach seems to view IFT-systems as 
illegal and unacceptable.   
 
This study employed two research designs and two research methods, in relation 
to two research sub-questions.  A cross-sectional design and data analysis was adopted 
for the global analysis of IFT-systems to answer the first sub-question: to what extent 
do IFT-systems (or are they likely to) thrive across countries despite adverse external 
environments?  The global landscape of IFT-businesses — a collection of IFT-risks faced 
by each country — entails the question of which countries are more — or less — 
susceptible to adverse environments, or external risks (e.g., an increased control of IFT-
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systems, fierce competition with formal remittance channels, and negative societal 
attitude towards the informality)?  The global analysis of IFT-risks is based on several 
secondary (public domain) datasets from international entities, such as the World Bank 
and the FATF.  These datasets deal with macro-level factors that are likely to be 
associated with IFT-activities, such as migration, financial inclusion, AML/CFT 
measures, and societal attitudes towards informality.  The global analysis resulted in the 
development of a global IFT-risk indicator that gauges the level of IFT-risk faced by each 
country in the form of a composite indicator.  A case study design and thematic analysis 
was used to address the second sub-question — how IFT-transactions are carried out 
despite the internal risks that IFT-users and IFT-brokers face (e.g., deception and 
betrayal) — by examining IFT-systems in Korea.  The case study on IFT-systems in 
Korea focused on investigating the adaptation of IFT-systems to the internal risks.  This 
was done by investigating the relationships between the actors involved in IFT-activities 
in light of trust and risk.  The data analyzed for this case study include the IFT-case 
reports of the Korean customs administration and the interviews with Korean 
government officials who investigated or had knowledge of IFT-systems.  In conducting 
research on the survival and adaptability of IFT-systems, this study is based on the view 
that IFT-systems in Korea are exposed to different environments from those in other 
developing countries.  In other words, IFT-systems that survive in — and adapt to — 
harsh external environments may have salient features that IFT-systems in favorable 
environments do not have or need.   
 
This study conducted an analysis of IFT-risks from 121 selected countries to 
provide a panoramic view on the global landscape of IFT-systems.  With macro-level 
factors that are likely to contribute to the survival of IFT-systems, this study a ‘global 
IFT-risk indicator’ to gauge the degree of survival (or prosperity) of IFT-systems across 
various countries.  Most of the developed countries analyzed were rated as having low 
IFT-risk, mainly because of a high level of access to formal financial institutions and a 
high level of compliance with international AML/CFT standards.  However, among the 
developed countries, some countries considered popular destinations for immigrants 
were rated as having a high level of IFT-risk.  On the other hand, most of the developing 
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countries were rated as being exposed to a high level of IFT-risk because of a large 
number of emigrants, poor formal financial systems, low compliance levels with 
international AML/CFT standards, and lenient attitudes towards illegality.  The global 
IFT-risk indicator suggests that the level of IFT-risk is related to the level of economic 
development of each country.   
 
 For the country-focused analysis (the local analysis) of IFT-systems in Korea, 
three theoretical frameworks — the sociology of (illegal) markets, social exchange 
theory, and the perspective of trust and risk — were employed to examine the 
relationships and interactions between the actors in IFT-systems.  This is because the 
focus of the local analysis is on interactions (e.g., trust, risk-taking, and transactions) 
between the actors in IFT-systems, rather than on the criminality of the actors or on 
criminogenic opportunities, and the three theoretical frameworks can be applied to IFT-
systems that operate in environments where ethnic ties, social embeddedness, and 
informal social control are weak or restricted.  Based on the theoretical frameworks, the 
local analysis of IFT-systems shed light on the internal dynamics of IFT-systems.  This 
study presented a temporal sequence of IFT-activities consisting of 11 procedures, 
inspired by Derek Cornish’s crime script analysis, and analyzed them, in terms of trust 
and risk.  While the main findings from the local analysis confirmed those of previous 
studies on IFT-systems, this study produced several new findings on IFT-systems.  IFT-
users and IFT-brokers actively used online banking services in sending funds to the 
other party.  This somewhat contrasts with the general assumption that IFT-systems are 
isolated from formal financial institutions, except with regard to the procedure for the 
settlement of outstanding debts between IFT-brokers.  This study identified ‘solo IFT-
brokers’, whose existence contradicts the conventional IFT-systems where separate IFT-
brokers in sending and receiving countries work together to transfer funds.  Through 
online banking services, solo IFT-brokers provided IFT-services in both sending and 
receiving countries without counterpart IFT-brokers.  This study found that online 
banking services also benefit IFT-users.  By using these services, remitters can easily 
send funds to IFT-brokers in remote places, leaving trails that work as a safeguard to 
protect them from IFT-brokers who fail to meet their obligations.  Online banking 
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systems therefore play an important role in reducing the vulnerability of both IFT-users 
and IFT-brokers facing social uncertainty.  This study also identified some variant IFT-
transactions, which differ from the traditional hawala-style IFT-transactions.  They 
transfer funds across borders through the wire-transfers of formal financial institutions 
and the physical transfer of cash.   
 
 As for policy recommendations, while critically reviewing existing AML/CFT 
measures against IFT-systems, this study puts forward not only general considerations 
for measures against IFT-systems, but also practical measures that would make it 
possible to take advantage of the external and internal risks that threaten IFT-systems.  
They are based on the situational crime prevention and behaviorally-informed 
approaches.  While the global IFT-risk indicator may enhance societal capacity to 
monitor IFT-risks across countries, these policy recommendations may provide the 
global AML/CFT community with more options in the fight against IFT-systems. 
  
